Speculative realists have directed a radical critique towards what they call “correlationism,” the stance according to which we only have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. Both Quentin Meillassoux and Ray Brassier have used Gilles Deleuze’s ontology as a paradigmatic example of correlationism. Instead of defending Deleuze from this accusation, I argue that we need to accept it, but that the correlation is drastically transformed when we take into (...) account Deleuze’s panpsychism. I hence contend that Deleuze is a panpsychist, grounding my argument in (a) his theory of contemplations and (b) his account of the universe as a cinema in itself. This changes everything, since a panpsychist type of correlationism avoids the main problem that leads both Meillassoux and Brassier to try to overcome correlationism, namely, that of the possibility of existence before and after humans. (shrink)

En el presente texto, se pregunta por el pasaje del idealismo trascendental de Immanuel Kant al empirismo trascendental de Gilles Deleuze. Sostendremos dos hipótesis: en primer lugar, que el principal elemento distintivo del segundo con respecto al primero es la ausencia de una condición de concordancia entre los flujos de las diferentes facultades; en segundo lugar, que la escena que Deleuze construye para dar cuenta de una síntesis disyuntiva entre elementos heterogéneos está a su vez inspirada en Kant, más específicamente (...) en la Analítica de lo sublime. Deleuze reelabora esta escena, en su primer sistema filosófico propio, para construir un encuentro que violenta la sensibilidad y fuerza a las diferentes facultades a un ejercicio autónomo que rompe con el sentido común y, sin embargo, encuentra una armonía en el fondo de la discordancia. (shrink)

This paper aims to clear two regular misunderstandings when comparing the thoughts of Gilles Deleuze and Martin Heidegger: firstly, the alleged opposition between Heideggerian negativity and Deleuzian positivity; secondly, the assumed contrariety between Deleuzian immanence and Heideggerian transcendence. In this fashion, the proposal is not so much to point at coincidences as to underline the fact that the differences are not where they are usually sought. The method used consists in taking Deleuze’s mentions to Heidegger in Difference and Repetition as (...) a common thread for tracking the Deleuzian use of Heideggerian concepts. We will attempt to show that both aspects of the Deleuzian transcendental field, the virtual and the intensive, hold a certain “negativity” and “concealment”, respectively, which runs against the picture of Deleuze as a philosopher of thorough and unconcealed manifestation. We will likewise argue that Heideggerian transcendence is not necessarily opposed to Deleuzian immanence, and that the Heideggerian concepts of Zwiefalt and Selbe are used by Deleuze in order to think of immanence. We contend that the distinction between the negative and the problematic allows Deleuze to speak of being even while accepting ontological difference. (shrink)

Existe-t-il une « politique deleuzienne »? Comment se saisir aujourd’hui du legs philosophique, aussi stimulant que problématique, que nous laisse Gilles Deleuze? La boîte à outils que constitue l’ensemble de ses développements prend des voies différentes en fonction de l’appareil avec lequel il se conjugue. On propose ainsi une présentation critique des principales lignes interprétatives de l’œuvre de Deleuze sur la question politique.

“Deleuze and the Inversion of Kantism”. In this paper we aim to look into French philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s work in order to see whether there is such a thing as a ‘reversal of Kantianism’, parallel to his more well-known reversal of Platonism. To this end, we will propose, firstly, to read in the key of reversal the movements made by Deleuze regarding intensity and extension, on the one hand, and the paradox of inner sense, on the other. Then, we will (...) analyze why Kant had already accomplished two great reversals, regarding the classical conception of both time and law, and consequently, we will develop the Deleuzean conception of Nietzschean eternal return as a simultaneous reversal of both aspects. Finally, we will inquire about the tropos of the aforementioned reversal, calling on the concepts of humor and irony. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone analizar el concepto de entendimiento infinito tal como es presentado por Salomon Maimon en el Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie y por Kant en los parágrafos §§76-78 de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar. Nos guiará la hipótesis de que Kant pudo haberse visto influenciado por Maimon, tanto en la formulación de dicho concepto como en el modo de abordar el problema que este viene a resolver, a saber, el de la indeterminación material de los (...) objetos de la filosofía trascendental. La comparación entre los planteos de ambos filósofos servirá para poner de relieve una problemática común. Sostendremos que, mientras que Kant ya había considerado un concepto de entendimiento infinito en la primera Crítica, es solo a partir del problema de la indeterminación que defenderá, luego de leer el manuscrito de Maimon, un uso crítico de dicho concepto. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of Gilles Deleuze’s interpreta- tion of the Critique of Pure Reason such as it appears in his 1963 monographic work La Philosophie critique de Kant. We will show that the originality of Deleuze’s reading lies in reading the critical project in retrospect, taking the sensus communis problem from the Critique of the Power of Judgment and applying it to the first Critique. In so doing, he points out the survival of (...) a pre-established harmony, now interiorized, both between heterogeneous faculties and between the matter of phenomena and the Ideas of reason. This implies a reinterpretation of the critical project that has passed unnoticed within Kantian studies and that places the Third Critique as the ground of the previous ones, unveiling common sense as a condition of possibility of knowledge. (shrink)